This paper examines whether the prohibition of selective disclosures to equity research analysts mandated by Regulation FD alters the amount of information and the manner in which it is revealed to the market. We demonstrate that equity research analysts are more responsive to information contained in companyinitiated disclosures after Reg. FD, suggesting that regulation has affected the importance of various channels of communication. We also present evidence consistent with the notion that managers use earnings guidance as a substitute for selective disclosure following the passage of Reg FD.
Although Reg FD is silent on how firms should respond to the elimination of selective disclosure, they have various mechanisms at their disposal to disclose private information such as earnings announcements, company issued earnings guidance, press releases, letters to share holders, and mandatory filings. 4 We examine whether firms stop providing this information or choose an alternative disclosure channel as a substitute for selective disclosure. We also consider whether the amount of information per disclosure channel and the amount on a per disclosure event basis change in the post-FD period.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the elimination of selective disclosure alters the overall information transmission process. This is an important distinction relative to other studies which tend to focus on only one particular aspect of the disclosure process such as earnings guidance. Since the information used to price securities is obtained from many sources, we believe that it is more appropriate to draw conclusions about the effect of Reg FD by considering how firms adjust their disclosure policies in the aggregate. The larger question then is whether and how managers change their relative usage of different disclosure channels in response to regulation.
Our empirical analysis indicates the following. First, firms rely more on public disclosures. In particular, there is a marked increase in the use of earnings guidance relative to other types of public disclosures. In the pre-FD world, managers used earnings guidance on an infrequent basis mainly to correct large discrepancies in information between managers and the analyst community. In the post-FD world, firms appear to use earnings guidance to maintain a steady flow of information.
informativeness of disclosures by credit rating agencies in the post-FD environment and find that the information content is higher and conclude that Reg FD has conferred a strategic advantage to rating agencies.
4 Bailey, et al. (2003) , Heflin, Subrahmanyman, and Zhang (2003) , Mac (2003) , and Feldman, Lazer, and Livnat (2003) report an increase in the amount of company issued earnings guidance and the number of firms issuing guidance.
Second, equity research analysts are more responsive to company-initiated public disclosures. We demonstrate that analysts are much more likely to revise their forecasts following a public disclosure event after Reg FD. This suggests that the passage of Reg FD has forced analysts to rely on public announcements as a primary source of new information rather than selective disclosures.
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Finally, after controlling for decimalization and time-varying risk, the only significant change in the information transmission process is an increased reliance on earnings guidance.
Not only do more firms use earnings guidance but they provide it relatively more often than other types of press releases.
We consider the increased use of earnings guidance to be a natural response to regulation because investors will still demand earnings-based information regardless of whether it is provided by analysts or companies. Managers are expected to respond to the elimination of selective disclosure by finding an appropriate substitute. We conjecture that earnings guidance is an ideal choice because it allows managers to communicate information that can improve forecast accuracy, yet avoids having to fully disclose all of the underlying information. 6 We conjecture that firms provide more guidance because they wish to maintain a steady flow of information. This is supported by our finding that the aggregate amount of information communicated via earnings guidance does not change, even though the number of guidance 5 Sunder (2003) compares firms that restrict analyst participation in conference calls to those that had open access prior to the adoption of Reg FD. He finds that asymmetric information is higher for firms that restrict participation and that this difference is eliminated after Reg FD is adopted. Zitzewitz (2002) examines analyst forecast revisions and finds that analysts have less private information post FD. Gintschel and Markov (2004) find that information contained in analyst forecast revisions declines by 28% after Reg FD. Mohanram and Sunder (2006) Bailey, et al. (2003) , and Agrawal, et al. (2006) find greater dispersion in analyst forecasts and higher levels of other measures of disagreement around earnings announcements.
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Although a reluctance to disclose detailed information is the most common cited explanation for providing earning guidance, it is not the only one. Several studies (Baginski, Hassle, and Kimbrough (2004) and Hutton, Miller, and Skinner (2003) ) show that forecasts are often bundled with other explanatory information. In these situations, the forecast may be provided to explain a situation more fully, rather than to hide relevant information. events increase. In effect, earnings guidance is used to smooth the rate of information flow.
We also confirm that, after Reg FD, the amount of information contained in the typical earnings guidance event is comparable to that contained in other public disclosures. This suggests that managers wait for a critical level of information to accumulate and then decide upon the best disclosure channel. If it is earnings-based, firms provide earnings guidance. If it reflects other information, such as a new product announcement, they use a press release. Since both channels are equally effective, managers select the one that is most appropriate.
One of the early debates concerning Reg FD is whether adoption of such regulation will cause firms to reduce the amount of information they disclose. Current studies that examine specific disclosure channels suggest that the amount of information has not been affected by regulation. Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2004) find that the amount of information disclosed during conference calls does not change after Reg FD. Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman (2004) (hereafter ETV) analyze market model residuals and indicate that the information flow around mandatory earnings announcements declines but that the overall information (mandatory earnings plus voluntary earnings guidance) does not appear to change after Reg FD. When all public disclosure channels are examined, we find that information disclosed by firms has not decreased and in some cases it has increased. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the sample of firms used in our analysis, the identification and classification of public information events, the measurement of analysts' responsiveness, and the approach used to estimate firm-specific information. Section II presents the testable hypotheses and the empirical results. Section III considers whether the large firm bias implicit in our sample selection procedure affects our results by replicating the analysis using a broader set of firms. Finally, Section IV offers our conclusions.
I. Sample Selection and the Measurement of Information Content
Our sample represents the 100 firms that have the most earnings revision activity in the First Call database during the fiscal year immediately preceding the passage of Reg FD. We also require that firms be included in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database in the fiscal years immediately preceding and following the passage of Reg FD. We adopt this sample selection procedure because sample firms have different fiscal year ends and we want to track firms through a complete annual reporting cycle in the pre-and post-Reg FD periods.
We focus on fiscal year-ends rather than fixed periods in calendar time as there is likely to be a transition period during which firms adjust their disclosure policies as they become more familiar with the requirements of Reg FD. For example, some firms will adopt procedures that work immediately and require no subsequent modification. Others firms will adopt initial policies that are subsequently modified as a set of "best" industry practices are established. 7 We examine firms with the most revision activity for two reasons. First, these firms tend to have rapidly changing information sets. If one wants to test whether Reg FD has changed the information disclosure environment, it makes sense to focus on a set of firms that are the most directly affected by its passage.
The second reason is practical. The process of hand-collecting and classifying all of the press releases is time consuming and expensive. The drawback is that our sample is comprised of relatively large firms that already have significant analyst activity.
Our sample of firms is distributed across 27 different industries based on two-digit SIC
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To illustrate how this sample selection criterion works, consider two firms that have fiscal years that respectively end on June and December. code. Table I indicates that, on average, there are 3.7 firms per industry. Although a large number of industries are represented, 22% of the sample are manufacturing companies (SIC 35).
The firms that attract the most analyst attention tend to be large (the log of market capitalization is $15.94 thousand) with high levels of trading activity (1.047 billion shares per month).
Not surprisingly, given the sample selection criterion, these firms attract significant analyst attention. 
A. Classification of Information Events by Disclosure Channel
To study the effect of Reg FD on public disclosure practices, we identify and classify information events by disclosure channel. The set of public disclosure channels we consider include press releases, company-issued earnings guidance, the filing of financial statements, and other mandatory disclosures designed to comply with securities regulations.
The Press Release subsample is obtained by selecting articles based on information contained in company-issued press releases. We identify 1,412 press release dates for the firms in our sample by searching for company news on the Dow Jones News Wire. The key words we use are the company's name or ticker and the phrase "press release." We then read each article that satisfies this criterion. Any articles that relate to the views of investment newsletters or were not released directly by the company itself are discarded.
We search for the following type of news reports: 1) earnings related, 2) mergers and acquisitions, 3) significant sales and acquisitions of assets relative to the capitalization of the firm, 4) changes in dividend policy, 5) actual, pending or possible changes in debt ratings, 6) developments related to actual, pending, and potential major lawsuits, 7) capital structure changes (e.g., security issues, buybacks, and recapitalizations), 8) retail store sales levels, and 9) any other news event that is deemed important (e.g., a new product announcement). The Unlike selective disclosures to analysts, earnings guidance represents a public disclosure of management's internal forecast of the level or possible range of future earnings. For instance, the company may be quite specific and indicate that they expect earnings to be "at or below" a certain amount. Alternatively, management may be rather vague and simply note that they are "not comfortable with" the consensus forecast.
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There are two primary reasons for issuing earnings guidance. The first is when management believes that the earnings implications of a particular information disclosure are difficult to interpret. In this case, we often find that CIGs are issued in conjunction with other announcements such as earnings reports or press releases. Second, there are times when management simply wishes to change analysts' interpretation of the existing information set The Press Release and CIG subsamples are of particular interest. Prior to the passage of Reg FD, management could selectively inform analysts about pending events as well as make private suggestions when they believed that analysts' earnings forecasts were in error. Since these disclosures are now prohibited, we expect companies to increase their reliance on both of these public communication channels. In essence, when one communication channel is blocked,
we expect firms to find other ways to release valuable information.
The final subset of public disclosures is the Earnings Report Date subsample. We include earnings announcements because significant information is revealed directly to investors and there tends to be significant revision activity when analysts are surprised by reported earnings.
We use First Call to identify quarterly and annual earnings report dates.
These three subsamples are not mutually exclusive. There are times when a firm issues earnings guidance or a press release at the same time it announces earnings. The fact that managers sometimes find it necessary to provide additional information to help investors 9 Bushee, et al. (2004) find that the amount of information disclosed during conference calls does not change after the adoption of Reg FD.
interpret earnings reports indicates that earnings are not fully informative.
B. Measuring Analyst Responsiveness
Since Reg FD is expected to eliminate selective disclosures of private information, analysts will naturally have to rely more on public information. Thus, one way to examine the effectiveness of Reg FD is to examine how analysts respond to public disclosures before and after Reg FD. If regulation is successful, analysts are expected to become more responsive to public disclosures.
The approach we adopt to measure analyst responsiveness relies upon the aggregate behavior of equity research analysts. Since the primary function of a research analyst is to obtain and interpret information, regardless of its source, we believe that this approach can be used to identify important information events. Analysts notify investors of material changes in the information set by revising earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. In essence, analysts function like "information capacitors" that discharge once a critical amount of information is accumulated. When viewed collectively, the number of analysts that make coincident revisions indicates the importance of a particular piece of information.
We define an "analyst cluster" as an event that causes multiple analysts to revise their earnings forecasts in a relatively short period of time. 10 Specifically, an analyst cluster is formed when more than 10% of the analysts that follow a particular company revise their earnings forecasts within a two-day window. We also require that an analyst cluster contain a minimum of three forecast revisions. 11 If a particular piece of information is difficult to interpret or multiple pieces of information are released within a short period of time, it is possible for a number of
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Mozes and Williams (1999) and Bagnoli, Levine, and Watts (2005) look at the stock price reactions surrounding analyst clusters.
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To evaluate the robustness of our results, we replicate our analysis based on a two and four revision minimum, and our conclusions do not change.
analyst clusters to overlap. When this occurs, we treat the overlapping clusters as a single cluster.
For our sample of firms (see discussion of sample selection earlier in Section III), we respectively identify 839 and 920 analyst clusters in the pre-and post-Reg FD periods. The average duration of an analyst cluster in the pre-Reg FD period is 35.81 hours (1.49 trading days) and contains 8.24 revisions. In the post-regulation period, the average duration of an analyst cluster increases 3.82 hours (t-stat of 3.61), which is largely caused by an increase of 1.31 revisions per cluster (t-stat of 4.68).
Using equity research analysts to assess the relative importance of information events raises a number of concerns. Specifically, analysts' earnings forecasts may not truthfully reflect their assessment of the firm's future earnings (e.g., analysts may purposely issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts to please the firm's management for the privilege to access management and gain underwriting business). The clustering of analyst behavior could be caused by analyst herding (e.g., Cooper, Day and Lewis (2001) ). Finally, analyst clustering may simply reflect changes in macroeconomic conditions. To bring greater clarity to these concerns, we address each one separately.
We do not believe that forecast bias is an important concern because, even if analysts report optimistic forecasts, one still expects them to adjust their biased forecasts in response to new information. Since analyst clusters only consider the timing rather than the magnitude of a forecast revision, our approach should be successful at identifying important information events.
Analyst herding has been documented in the literature. For example, Cooper, et al. (2001) indicate that weaker analysts tend to wait until lead analysts make forecast revisions before revising their own forecasts. Clement and Tse (2005) suggest that herding forecasts may result from uninformed mimicry of other forecasters rather than reflect analysts' own information. In either case, this is not an issue for our cluster method as lead analysts typically possess superior information or are more skillful. In either case, a cluster that forms behind a lead analyst due to herding still likely reflects material firm specific information.
Macroeconomic news may cause analysts to change earnings forecasts. Although these information events are not a direct result of company-initiated disclosures, they still reflect the arrival of new information. Analysts interpret this news in the context of how it affects the firms they follow. Their forecast revisions not only reflect market-wide information but also an attempt to measure how this information impacts specific firms.
C. Measuring Information Content
Stock returns reflect changes in market-wide and firm-specific information. Since Reg FD is designed to control the manner in which firm-specific information is disclosed to investors, it is important to measure firm-specific information by filtering out changes in market-wide information. The basis for our measure is abnormal returns that are calculated from market and Fama-French three-factor models.
The estimation of abnormal returns is complicated by the fact that on January 29, 2001 most of the stocks in our sample switched from reporting stock prices on the basis of "teenies" ($0.0625) to decimals ($0.01). This is a concern because Bessembinder (2003) finds that stock return volatility is significantly reduced following the switch to decimals.
12 Studies of Reg FD that control for decimalization (Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong (2003) and ETV find that there is no change in return volatility in the pre-and post-Reg FD periods after controlling for decimalization. They also document that, without decimalization controls, return volatility decreases suggesting that volatility declines are caused by the change to decimalization rather 12 Gottlieb and Kalay (1985) present a theoretical analysis of the impact of price discreteness on return volatility. They show that price discreteness will cause the variance and higher order moments of the rate of return to be biased upwards, thus suggesting that decimalization will lower return volatility. than the adoption of Reg FD.
The switch to decimalization produces three different trading regimes: 1) the period before Reg FD, 2) the period after Reg FD but before decimalization, and 3) the period after Reg FD but after decimalization. Since risk may change over the different regimes, we estimate separate market model and Fama-French coefficients within each trading regime. For our tests that rely on public announcement dates, we use all return data except for the day of and the day immediately following public announcement dates. For tests that rely on analyst clusters, we use return data for all non-cluster days. The within sample estimates are then used to generate abnormal returns that control for changes in volatility.
The market model regression is estimated over non-cluster days as (1) where is the daily excess return for firm on day , is the daily excess return for a proxy for the market portfolio on day , and is the risk free rate of interest on day . The market proxy ( ) is the value-weighted stock market return for the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq from CRSP. The proxy for the risk free rate ( ) is the one-month U.S.
Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates. The abnormal return is then calculated as (2) using the market model coefficients for firm from the trading regime at time .
For the Fama-French three-factor model, we estimate the following factor regression over non-cluster days
where is the small minus big size factor and is the high minus low book-to-market factor. 13 Abnormal returns are calculated as
The next step is to convert abnormal returns into an estimate of the amount of firmspecific information per analyst cluster using ETV's cumulative information measure ( ). To do this, we calculate the squared value of the sum of the abnormal returns over analyst cluster for a given firm , scaled by an analogous information measure from outside the cluster period, e.g., ,
where is the number of days in analyst cluster , is the start date of analyst cluster , is the abnormal return on day for firm , and is the mean-squared error of the residuals estimated from the abnormal return model for firm over the trading regime at time for all noncluster days.
We sum abnormal returns over the cluster period because some analysts act in a more timely manner than others, while others delay revising their earnings forecasts in order to freeride on the additional information contained in the forecast revisions of more timely analysts. 14 A key feature of the cluster-based approach is that it reduces the noise associated with daily abnormal returns by controlling for potential serial correlation due to this type of learning. The benefit of scaling by is that it accounts for firm-level heteroscedasticity and for changes in volatility over time due to decimalization and changing market conditions. The estimates are averaged across analyst clusters for each firm in the periods
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Factor returns are obtained from Ken French's data website at .
14 Cooper, et al. (2003) describe how analysts use the information contained in other analysts' forecast revisions to increase forecast accuracy. before and after Reg FD, and logs are taken. This measure reflects the cumulative information flow during an analyst cluster relative to days on which firm-specific information has not been released. The measure is constructed so that it is equal to one and the corresponding log is equal to zero under the null hypothesis that the rate of information flow is the same across all days.
We also want to compare the aggregate information contained in analyst clusters to non- 
where cumulates information across all of the information events of type across all firms. The average value of is computed before and after regulation, and then logged after adding a small constant.
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We subtract from the summation because under the null hypothesis, has a mean of one. The benefit of this adjustment is that it focuses on the aggregate incremental information provided by a particular announcement type and does not consider a communications channel to be more informative simply because certain types of announcements are made more frequently. That is, this measure isolates the incremental information disclosed across different channels in a way that is not confounded by the frequency of disclosure. For example, the statistic controls for the possibility that firms may increase the number of earnings guidance events, even though the amount of information is the same.
ETV choose a small constant that is equal to so that a log transformation that approaches a normal distribution in the cross-section can be computed.
II. Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Evidence
We examine whether the elimination of selective disclosure changes: 1) the manner in which information is disclosed, 2) analyst responsiveness to different types of information disclosures, 3) the amount of firm-specific information reflected in stock prices, and 4) the amount of information contained in typical information events.
A. Information Channels and the Distribution of Events
The first hypothesis relates to expected changes in the distribution of event types across information channels. It predicts that companies are expected to rely more on public disclosure once selective disclosure is prohibited. For example, companies are expected to make greater use of earnings guidance and press releases. Table III presents evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. As predicted, the mean number of times a firm provides earnings guidance increases by 90.8% (2.52 to 4.81), which has a p-value of less than 0.0001. 16 Of the 100 firms in our sample, the number that use earnings guidance after Reg FD increases dramatically from 39 to 72. This suggests that there is a substantial change in the use of earnings guidance in response to the new regulations.
Interestingly, the frequency with which firms issue other press releases only increases 1.7% (7.22 to 7.34), suggesting that firms prefer using earnings guidance more than standard press releases.
Other studies do not consider press releases. 
B. Information Disclosure and Analyst Behavior
Since Reg FD is designed to prevent private communications between equity research analysts and the management of the companies they cover, firms are expected to release all material information through public disclosure channels. Without selective disclosure, analysts learn about new information at the same time as public investors. As a result, we expect to observe a type of herding where analysts quickly revise their forecasts in response to the information contained in company-initiated, public disclosures. This leads to the empirical prediction that the number of analyst clusters associated with public disclosures will increase after Reg FD.
We can summarize the testable predictions of this hypothesis as follows:
(H2) Analyst Responsiveness (AR) Hypothesis. Following the passage of Reg FD, more analysts revise earnings forecasts in response to company issued public announcements
because it is more difficult for analysts to obtain private information. Table III provides evidence about the rates that analyst clusters form following public disclosure events before and after Reg FD. Consistent with the AR hypothesis, Panel A indicates that the number of analyst clusters that form immediately after earnings announcements increases 4.7% (3.60 to 3.77) on a per firm basis. Similarly, Panel B reports that the number of times an analyst cluster forms after a firm provides earnings guidance increases by 79.8% (2.33 to 4.19) on a per firm basis. As a result, we find that firms not only provide more earnings guidance, but the rate that analyst clusters form in response to earnings guidance across all firms increases from 67.43% to 90.12%. This rate is calculated as the number of analyst clusters associated with earnings guidance events to the total number of earnings guidance events. Panel C indicates that the number of analyst clusters that form after other types of press releases increases 38.7% (2.74 to 3.80) on a per firm basis despite the fact that the number of press releases per firm does not change much at all (7.22 to 7.44). The rate that an analyst cluster is associated with a press release across all firms increases from 27.55% to 42.75%. Table III also reports median values and the results are qualitatively similar.
The results in Panels A, B, and C of Table III are consistent with the AR hypothesis.
They imply that, in the post Reg FD period, analysts appear to learn about newsworthy events from company-initiated public disclosures rather than through pre-release selective disclosures.
In results not reported in the paper, the number of analyst clusters that are not associated with a specific public disclosure event does not change (5.10 to 4.95). When viewed in the context of the increases in the number of public disclosures, it appears that firms increase their reliance on public disclosure channels when communicating firm-specific information directly to the public.
One potential caveat is that analyst clusters can form in response to either firm-specific or market-wide information. This is a concern because if changing market conditions may cause information to flow at higher rates, the increase in analyst clusters may be an artifact of the information environment. We do not believe this is a problem for our study as there is no reason for changing market conditions to affect the frequency that particular information events are associated with analyst clusters. We assume that the number of analysts responding to public information events will increase only if these events are relatively more important to analysts after Reg FD.
C. Changes in the Aggregate Information per Channel
The third hypothesis reflects the observation that, if less information is disclosed through private channels, public disclosure is expected to contain more information. We define this hypothesis as:
(H3) Aggregate Information Per Channel (AIPC) Hypothesis. The aggregate amount of information contained in public disclosures is expected to increase following Reg FD.
We examine this hypothesis by comparing the aggregate amount of information contained in public announcements before and after Reg FD. This hypothesis is based on the implicit assumption that aggregate firm-specific information is the same before and after Reg FD. Next, we compare the aggregate information contained in analyst clusters as well as the subsets associated with public and non-public announcements.
The Aggregate Information Contained in Public Announcements
Table IV reports measures of the aggregate information flow for public information channels. The first three columns report statistics (see Equation 6 ) for earnings reports, earnings guidance, and press releases over the event window. The first thing to note is that public disclosure events contain significant amounts of new information relative to other days not associated with public announcements. The statistics, which range from 1.638 to 2.185, are significantly greater than zero (the statistic has mean zero under the null hypothesis of no information).
The evidence in Table IV is weakly consistent with the AIPC hypothesis. Most of the measures increase in the post-Reg FD period. Unfortunately, none of these changes are statistically significant at conventional levels. This result is surprising when viewed in the context of our previous finding that the amount of earnings guidance has increased significantly and that analysts are more likely to respond to earnings guidance and press releases after Reg FD.
We address this apparent paradox by noting that the role of earnings guidance is likely to have changed after Reg FD. Prior to its passage, earnings guidance was used on an infrequent basis to disseminate time-sensitive information or to correct large discrepancies in the consensus earnings forecast of analysts. In those few cases management felt compelled to provide earnings guidance, it provided significant information. Once companies are prohibited from making selective disclosures of earnings-based information to analysts, we expect companies to treat earnings guidance in much the same way they did selective disclosure. Consistent with this interpretation, the number of firms providing earnings guidance and the number of times the typical company provides it increases significantly after Reg FD.
An alternative explanation is that we do not have a sufficiently large sample to detect significant differences. We evaluate the robustness of these findings by extending our analysis to a broader set of firms in Section IV. We perform the same tests conducted here on earnings reports and earnings guidance and find statistically significant results that support the AIPC hypothesis.
The Aggregate Information Contained in Analyst Clusters
The next step is to investigate whether the information set used by analysts has been affected by the passage of Reg FD. We use the set of all analysts clusters to control for other information events such as the public disclosures of other firms, market-wide news, and even selective disclosures to a group of analysts (presumably a pre-FD event) . 17 This provides an indirect way to measure the valuation impact of these other sources. One benefit of this is that we do not need to engage in the almost impossible task of hand collecting press release data for all potentially related companies.
The "All Clusters" column of Table IV reports the statistics for all analyst clusters,
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In our analysis, we use abnormal returns to measure firm specific information. To the extent that market-wide shocks induce analysts to revise earnings forecasts, our information measure only reflects the firm specific component because we filter out the market-wide component.
regardless of the source of information. The All Clusters category is not simply the union of all company-initiated, public disclosure events (Columns 1 through 3) . Rather, it represents the set of all analyst clusters regardless of the underlying reason for its formation. It includes those events in the first three columns that resulted in an analyst cluster as well as all other analyst clusters that may have formed (e.g.,, behind earnings reports, issue guidance, and press releases of other companies).
Column 4 indicates that there is more information contained in analyst clusters after Reg FD. Panel A reports a statistically significant increase of 7.2% (2.718 to 2.914) based on market model residuals. When this is combined with our finding that analyst clusters are more likely to form behind public disclosure events following Reg FD, it suggests that analysts no longer learn about these information events on a selective basis. If this were not the case, part of this information would be revealed at the time analysts revise their forecasts in response to an (illegal) selective disclosure, leaving less information to be revealed on the date of the companyinitiated disclosure.
D. Changes in the Informativeness of Individual Information Events
Since the amount of information disclosed through public channels and the number of analyst clusters associated with these channels is expected to increase after Reg FD, the next question we consider is whether individual disclosure events contain more information. One possibility is that public disclosures contain more incremental information because companies no longer "leak" information to analysts prior to the announcement.
Alternatively, managers may realize that they need to release information directly to public investors, which they previously provided on a selective basis. If earnings guidance is used as a substitute for selective disclosure, firms will make more frequent disclosures that contain smaller amounts of information. In effect, firms use earnings guidance to ensure that information is distributed ratably. Prior to Reg FD, they could use selective disclosure to do this.
Since this disclosure channel is blocked after regulation, firms turn to earnings guidance as a close substitute. This hypothesis is formally defined as follows: To test the SDS hypothesis, we estimate the average statistic on a per event basis before and after Reg FD. Consistent with this hypothesis, Table V indicates that the mean drops from 5.30 to 2.75. This represents a substantial decline of 48.1%, which is significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.024). We have previously shown that: 1) the number of companies issuing earnings guidance increases, 2) the number of times a given company issues earnings guidance increases, 3) analysts are more responsive to earnings guidance, and 4) the aggregate information, on a per firm basis, across all earnings guidance events does not change. These observations suggest that earnings guidance is being used as a substitute for selective disclosure. When these results are coupled with the finding that the information contained in the typical earnings guidance event decreases, it suggests that firms use earnings guidance to maintain a steady flow of information. Once investors realize that earnings guidance is the preferred method for communicating earnings-based information, they treat it as a standard disclosure channel. This is reinforced by the observation that the typical earnings guidance has a price impact that is similar to other public disclosures in the post-FD period.
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III. Information Transmission and Firm Size
All of our results are based on a sample of firms that are selected because they receive the most attention from equity research analysts. Since we use analyst forecast revisions to identify important information events, this sample selection procedure increases the power of our testing approach. However, there is a potential concern because small firms may be more adversely affected by Reg FD than large firms (see Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006) and Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira (2007) ). Since firms with the largest analyst following typically also have the largest market capitalizations, our results may not generalize to smaller firms.
One of the major findings in Gomes, et al. (2007) is that the cost of capital increases after analysts drop research coverage. We address this issue by replicating part of our analysis on an expanded sample that includes all firms in the First Call database that have at least one forecast revision in the fiscal years immediately preceding and following the adoption of Reg FD.
The only thing that prevents us from performing a complete replication of our previous analysis is that we did not collect the corresponding press releases for the full sample. Since our sample selection procedure requires firms to have at least one forecast in the pre-and post-Reg FD periods, our expanded sample includes small firms that have experienced declines in research coverage but not firms that actually lose analyst coverage. There are 145 firms that completely lose analyst coverage. It is worth noting that our selection procedures also exclude firms where analysts initiate coverage (108 firms) because an analogous argument suggests that coverage initiations should decrease their costs of capital. The final sample results in 2,398 firms. 18 We also consider whether a changes in analysts' information is associated with a larger change in stock prices in the post-FD period using a regression-based approach. Since the results are qualitatively similar to these discussed above, we do not report them here. They are available upon request from the authors.
Since the number of coverage drops and initiations are small relative to the total sample of firms available, the test results for this sample should provide an adequate robustness check.
Based on this analysis, we find very few qualitative differences between the active revision sample and the expanded sample, and conclude that our results are not affected by firm size. First note that, by definition, there is less revision activity in the full sample because our original sample was selected on the basis of high revision activity. Table IV . The statistic that is estimated across all analyst clusters increases 2.9% (2.773 to 2.854), which is statistically significant (p-value 0.001). We also find that the aggregate information contained in earnings reports increases by 4.9% (1.534 to 1.609) after regulation, which is statistically significant (p-value = 0.038). Similar to our results for the active revision sample, the change in the aggregate information associated with earnings guidance is statistically insignificant, consistent with the hypothesis that earnings guidance is used as a substitute for selective disclosure.
Panel B provides qualitatively similar results when aggregate firm-specific information is based on the Fama-French three factor model. Taken together, the evidence is comparable with that reported in Table IV . Based on our analysis of the expanded sample, we conclude that our earlier findings are not affected by firm size. 
IV. Conclusion
The passage of Reg FD eliminates the practice of making selective disclosures to equity research analysts and requires firms to use public channels to disseminate information. This paper examines how companies alter their approach to disclosing information in response to these new requirements. We address the following questions: 1) Has the elimination of selective disclosure resulted in more information being released directly to public investors?, 2) Has analyst behavior changed once they no longer receive selective disclosures?, 3) Has the manner in which firms choose to publicly disclose information changed?, 4) Has the aggregate amount of information per disclosure "channel" changed?, and 5) Has the amount of information per disclosure event changed?
Our empirical findings indicate the following. After controlling for decimalization and time-varying risk, the aggregate amount of firm-specific information reflected in public disclosure events following the adoption of Reg FD does not decline. Consistent with this finding, we provide evidence that aggregate firm-specific information associated with certain types of public disclosure events actually increases for an expanded sample that includes all firms in the First Call database,.
Consistent with the original intentions of the SEC, we find that the manner that firmspecific information is disclosed shifts to public disclosure channels. Interestingly, most of the adjustments are designed to provide earnings guidance. In effect, regulation has changed the role played by earnings guidance for corporate managers. Prior to Reg FD, earnings guidance was primarily used to correct large discrepancies in information between managers and the analyst community. After regulation, firms appear to use earnings guidance to maintain a steady flow of information that was previously communicated on a selective basis to analysts. We also find that once selective disclosure is eliminated, analysts are more responsive to company-initiated disclosures and more information is disclosed through public channels.
Overall, these findings lead us to conclude that Reg FD has been successful in encouraging firms to disclose information through public information channels. Our empirical findings have important implications for the evaluation of the effectiveness of Reg FD and for other markets that may consider similar regulations. We conclude that it is important to control for all of potential disclosure channels when studying the impact of changes in the information disclosure environment. Panel A reports the aggregate firm-specific information contained in public disclosure events and analyst clusters in the fiscal years immediately preceding and following Regulation FD using the market model to measure abnormal returns. Columns 1 through 3 report results for the following public disclosure events: earnings reports, earnings guidance, and press releases. Column 4 reports results for all analyst clusters regardless of whether they are specifically identified with a company-initiated disclosure event. Panel B reports the same statistics using the Fama-French three-factor model to measure abnormal returns. Panel A reports the average amount of firm-specific information contained in public disclosure events and analyst clusters before and after Reg FD using the market model to measure abnormal returns per analyst cluster. Columns 1 through 3 report results for the following public disclosure events: earnings reports, earnings guidance, and press releases. Column 4 reports results for all analyst clusters regardless of whether they are specifically identified with a company-initiated disclosure event. Panel B reports the same statistics using the Fama-French three-factor model to measure abnormal returns. Panel A reports the aggregate amount of firm-specific information ( ) contained in earnings reports (Column 1) and earnings guidance events Column 2) in the fiscal years immediately preceding and following Regulation FD using the market model to measure abnormal returns. Column 3 reports measures for the combination of earnings reports and earnings guidance events. Finally, Column 4 reports results for all analyst clusters regardless of whether they are specifically identified with a company-initiated disclosure event. Panel B reports the same statistics using the Fama-French three-factor model to measure abnormal returns. The test statistics are distributed Student and the corresponding p-values are reported. Panel A reports the average amount of firm-specific information contained in earnings reports (Column 1) and earnings guidance events (Column 2) in the fiscal years immediately preceding and following Regulation FD using the market model to measure abnormal returns. Column 3 reports measures for the combination of earnings reports and earnings guidance events. Finally, Column 4 reports results for all analyst clusters regardless of whether they are specifically identified with a company-initiated disclosure event. Panel B reports the same statistics using the Fama-French three-factor model to measure abnormal returns. The test statistics are distributed Student and the corresponding p-values are reported. 
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